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Abstract
This paper introduces a new method of Blockchain formation for reliable storage
of personal data of ID-card holders. In particular, the model of the information
system is presented, the new structure of smart ID-cards and information on
these cards are proposed. The new structure of Blockchain - ”Blockchain Tree”
allows not only to store information from ID-cards but also to increase the level
of security and access control to this information. The proposed Subchains
system allows to integrate Blockchain of the lower level to Blockchain of the
higher level, allowing to create a multilevel protected system.
Keywords: Blockchain, ID-card, Personal Data Protection, Blockchain Tree,
Blockchain for migration system
1. Introduction
The use of information resources and government services in the modern
world implies unambiguous user identification. To this end, many states create
so-called digital personalities. The most famous example of such a system in
the EU is Estonia. In this country, every citizen can get not only the usual
ID-card for the EU countries but also the mobile-ID. Using their digital ID, an
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ID-holder may get an online access to most government services, remotely open
a bank account, register a company, make an appointment for a doctor, etc.
The physical medium of such an identifier is an ID card [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. All
countries of the European Union issue national ID-cards to citizens and resi-
dents.
The chip of the card stores information about its owner: full name, gender, na-
tional identification number, fingerprints, cryptographic keys and certificates.
A card holder has the right to use the ID-card as an identity card for travel
through the territory of the European Union and for crossing its external bor-
ders both for entry and exit from the countries of the European Union, the
European Economic Area, including Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.
We consider the issue of this cards security, because a single card contains a key
to all personal data of a citizen.
Firstly, the chip on a smart card is a sufficiently protected microcomputer that
has a microprocessor, a cryptographic co-processor, and some memory (flash
or EEPROM). Unlike a standard micro-controller, an access to the memory of
a smart card is strictly controlled by the processor. Thus, both reading and
recording of the data are regulated by the software of the card itself. Moreover,
chip manufacturers are taking measures to prevent unauthorized access (copying
all the memory, reprogramming) to the card at electronic and physical levels.
Secondly, all the data in the card is encrypted (in the Estonian map 2048 bit
encryption is used). Thirdly, the downloaded applications (applets) cannot be
read from the card by anyone, including the cardholder (an applet can only be
erased and a new one should be written instead of the erased one on its place).
You can only pass a command to the applet and get a response.
Fourth, you need a PIN-code for the card, and sometimes two: the first one for
authorization and the second one for confirmation of operations.
However, despite all the advantages of such protection, the system is not secure
from unauthorized changes of personal information from the inside (for exam-
ple, due to server hacking, etc.), from creation of fake digital personalities on
the basis of which can be used to obtain legal documents and from sale of per-
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sonal data to external interested organizations (a recent example of Facebook).
In addition, the analysis of Internet search results for buy EU ID-card shows
an abundance of offers to sell clones of real EU documents. Using Blockchain
technology [6] can help eliminate the first two threats and increase control over
the use of such information by authorized users. Blockchain is a well known
technology used in Bitcoin [7, 8, 9] and other cryptocurrencies [10, 11]. Suc-
cessful attempts are also being made to introduce this technology in areas of
bank transfers [12], logistics [13], energy [14], IoT [15], [16] and healthcare [17].
Blockchain, by definition, is a distributed database in which each subsequent
block containing information is associated with the previous one. The genera-
tion of each block must be confirmed by other participants. Nowadays there are
several concepts of the Blockchain consensus algorithms - Proof of Work (POW)
[18],[19], Proof of Stake (POS) [20],[21], Proof of Importance (POI) [22], Proof
of Activity (POA) [23] etc. The most common algorithm is Proof of Work.
However, this algorithm uses too many resources to generate blocks; it is too
slow and in many cases not necessary for building a block system. For example,
when all nodes of a network are well known and are state organizations. This
structure of chain may be used for implementation of Blockchain in systems
for checking Smart Tickets in transport, driver licenses, education degree docu-
ments etc.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we analyze the model
of information system utilizing ID-cards, ID-card structure and the structure
of information in ID-card. The results obtained of the study are introduced in
Section 3. Finally, we present the conclusions obtained from our research and
discuss the possibilities for future work in Section 4.
2. Background
We further consider the methodology we propose for constructing Blockchain
for the network, all nodes of which are verified servers of ”Migration Police” that
store personal information about citizens and existing ID-cards.
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2.1. Information system model
The model of information system utilizing ID-cards handling consists of the
following major entities:
• citizen ID-cards;
• data of registered citizens (database in a wide sense);
• tools for ID-cards verification;
• tools for database administration;
• tools for new ID-cards issuing.
The interaction between them can be presented schematically (Fig. 1).
Figure 1: The schematic representation of ID-cards verification and issuing process
It is seen from Fig. 1 that the entities principal interaction occurs dur-
ing ID-card issuing and ID-card verification. The procedure of ID-card issuing
implements the following relations:
Issuing =


Accounting : PD → DB,
Manufacturing : PD → ID.
where: PD is a set of EU citizen’s personal data that concerns citizenship; DB
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is a set of database elements used by legal officers during performance of their
duties; ID is a set of all ID-cards issued so far.
It is obligatory for ID and DB to contain corresponding data for a given citizen.
The latter is possible only in case, when these sets are isomorphic in relation
to contained data DB ⇔ ID . Consequently, their power should be the same
‖DB‖ = ‖ID‖ and for the given i ≤ ‖DB‖, i ∈ N the following isomorphic
equality is to take place dbi ⇔ idi , where dbi ∈ DB and idi ∈ ID. The latter
is correct only when DB and ID are both particular instances of sets lists, i.e.
bounded ordered sets. As it was mentioned above, ID-card issuing process is an
object of ID-card forgery attack, which mathematically can be described in the
following form:
∀pdj ∈ PD,Manufacturing(pdj) /∈ ID; ∃dbi ∈ DB,⇔Manufacturing(pdi).
This presentation shows that it is essential to have unattached database
entry index to the ID-card. Lists could solve this issue, but their ability isn’t
enough, because the given i-th element could be replaced. That’s why we suggest
using data structure, which allows adding information to the DB, but forbids its
deletion, replacement or alteration of Blockchain, where data from the respective
ID-card would be bonded to one block.
The other relation shown on Fig. 1 is ID-card verification. The process can be
presented in the following form:
V erification : ID ×DB → {true; false}.
In the case when a Blockchain is used for data storage, the verification op-
erator includes block number comparison, addition to the usual data content
and its hash digits comparison. Moreover, fixed Blockchain structure and dis-
tribution would help to prevent attacks focused on database content. Bearing in
mind above mentioned results, the scheme presented on Fig. 1 could be further
detailed by one shown on Fig. 2.
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Figure 2: Detailed schematic representation of ID-cards verification and issuing
process
2.2. ID-card structure
The ID-cards are used as citizen authentication factor as well as a tool for
Blockchain interaction. The latter is essential in the case when Blockchain is
created as shown on Fig. 4. In the case, ID-card user gains additional protection
against intrusion into respective SubBlockchain. For instance, if intruder tries
to fake his identity, he would have to break both country’s security measures and
signature, generated by ID-card. The signature is created by the key derived
from user-specific data (e.g. fingerprints) and ID-card specific data.
To implement this feature ID-card should contain chip that provides inter-
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action with application interface of the Blockchain. The chip needs to have the
following major blocks:
• encrypted memory, which contains personal data (i.e. respective block or
SubBlockchain’s genesis block);
• private key derivation block for avoiding private key leakage;
• signature creation block for validating changes of personal data, which
could be performed when certain personal data is changed;
• interface for external interaction.
The generalized structure of ID-card processor is shown on Fig. 3.
Figure 3: Generalized structure of ID-card processor
Interaction with ID-card could be performed in several ways, so certain pro-
tocol should be used. The most common task of an ID-card is providing data.
Therefore, in this case ID-card would function in the following way:
• reading interface query and transmitting it to the interaction protocol sup-
port block;
• validating the correctness of the query and determining the data fields of
ROM, which are to be accessed;
• sending respective addresses to ROM and transferring them to interface;
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• sending data according to the interface query.
Despite the comparative rarity of the cases, when data of the person is
changed, still in most cases it shouldn’t be performed without this person. To
validation of this changing the person is to possess ability to sign such transac-
tions for instance by using the card. For this purpose, the following steps should
be performed:
• receiving respective frame-command interaction protocol support block is
to wait for additional personal data input;
• after respective data input is received interaction protocol support block
transfers it to private key derivation block and sends query to respective
fields of ROM for ID-card specific data;
• using inputs private key, derivation block yields key and sends it to signa-
ture creation block;
• meanwhile, interaction protocol support block sends data to be signed to
signature creation block, where respective signature is obtained and out-
putted via interface.
2.3. Block structure (Information structure on a chip)
The block consists of the following main parts: header, data, block hash.
Header structure is determined by Blockchain consensus rules and as such is
heavily depend on particular protocol implementation. The most common fields
of the block headers and the ones, used in particular cases are the following ones:
• version - contains version of the block, which defines structure of other
block’s fields, used consensus protocol peculiarities, presumed forks mark-
ers etc;
• hash value of previous block - the integral part of any Blockchain, which
provides cryptographic proof of its integrity;
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• hash value of block content - generally is used for data integrity protection,
but in the considered case of use it is also essential for rapid Blockchain
content search;
• creation Timestamp - primary intent is to boost protection by limiting po-
tential forger by this field value (its value must be in time window between
the blocks preceding and following creation timestamps (Creation Times-
tamps)), while the field could be used to aid stored data processing;
• creator identifier of authentication data - is supposed to determine the
source of the block (node) as for legal data all sources, i.e. nodes, are to
be determined and be authorised by respective government structures.
In this particular case, several sources might act as creators of transaction.
For instance, in case of citizenship changing, the citizen and respective govern-
ments are such source. That’s why the multisig technique should be used for
this type of transactions.
Header may include other meta-data depending on the consensus, such as nonce
and difficulty for PoW consensus or number of included transactions for Blockchains
where this number can vary. The example of EU ID-card is Estonian ID-card.
The Table 1 shows the contents of a personal data file stored on an ID-card [18].
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Table 1: Contents of a personal data file stored on an ID-card
N Content Example Length(bites)
1 Surname Smith Max 28
2 First name line 1 John Max 15
3 First name line 2 Max 15
4 Sex M 1
5 Nationality POL 3
6 Date of birth 01.01.1971 10
7 Personal ID code 37101010021 11
8 Document number X0010536 8 or 9
9 Expiry date 13.08.2019 10
10 Place of birth POOL/POL Max 35
11 Date of issuance 13.08.2014 10
12 Permit type PERMANENT Max 50
13 Notes line 1 EL KODANIK/EU CITIZEN Max 50
14 Notes line 2 ALALINE ELAMISOIGUS Max 50
15 Notes line 3 PERMANENT RIGHT OF RESIDENCE Max 50
16 Notes line 4 LUBATUD TOOTAD Max 50
We suggest adding extra areas in the chip memory. Thus, the data part of
the block will include holder’s information as it is shown in the Table 2. In order
to provide whole block integrity we suggest using extra hashing of its content,
i.e. header and data. The latter hash value is to be used to alter of the blocks.
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Table 2: Contents of a personal data stored on an ID-card
N Content Example Length(bites)
1 Community of issue Milano Max 28
2 Serial number AA00000BB Max 15
3 First name line 1 John Max 15
4 First name line 2 Max 15
5 Surname Smith Max 15
6 Place of the birth Milano Max 35
7 Sex M 1
8 Nationality ITA 3
9 Date of birth 01.01.1971 10
10 Stature 186 3
11 Citizenship ITA 3
12 Image of the holder’s signature ”digital scan” 50
13 Validity for expatriation 13.08.2014 10
14 Photography ”Digital photo” Max 50
15 Images of 2 fingerprints (one finger of
the right hand and one finger of the left
hand)
”Digital photo” Max 50
16 Parents (in the case of a minor’s card) Max 50
17 Fiscal Code (Personal ID code) ABCDEF00B00A111W 16
18 Address of residence Verona str., 1, Rome Max 50
19 Tax code in the form of a bar-code Bar-code Max 100
20 Information about the documents on
the basis of which the ID-card was is-
sued
- Max 50
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Table 3: Continuation of Table 2
N Content Example Length(bites)
21 The number of the block storing in-
formation about the previous ID-card
(in case of renewal or update of the
card).This parameter = 0 if the card is
issued for the first time
- Max 50
22 ID of migration police officer who cre-
ated personal file of a citizen
- Max 50
23 Notes line 4 Permanent residence Max 50
24 Notes line 4 - Max 50
25 Notes line 4 - Max 50
3. Main results
3.1. Blockchain for a database
The proposed network structure is a classical peer-to-peer (P2P) topology,
in which all elements are interconnected (Fig.4).
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Holders of ID-cards
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Figure 4: Overall structure of the network. The nodes are police, special services,
migration department branches, other state organizations which have access to
personal data. The users of the information are police, migration officers, employ-
ees of special services as well as third parties authorized by the state or holder
of the information.
The nodes of this network are servers of the regional branches of the mi-
gration service, which has the right to issue documents to residents (ID-cards,
passports, etc.). All nodes are equal. The network has a fixed number of nodes.
Each node is verified and included in the list of approved nodes. This list is
stored on each node and only devices from this list can create new blocks. The
structure of the chain has the form shown on Fig.5.
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Figure 5: General structure of Blockchain
Each block contains information about one ID-card. Transactions are per-
sonal data of ID-card holders. Created block must be confirmed by more than
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50%+1 of verified nodes. After that, information is written in the block, added
to the chain and sent to other nodes. Thus, each element of the system stores
a complete Blockchain. In the case of detecting a change in information in an
existing block, this block will be automatically replaced with the ”right” one
that exists on at least 50%+1, of other nodes of the network. Given that the
blocks in the chain are sequentially linked to each other, the alternation of one
block will lead to change of the entire chain. This will be detected and corrected
by the rest of the network nodes. Such an algorithm prevents the creation of
fake personalities in the system with dates in the past.
3.2. Blockchain integration
It should be borne in mind that the EU is building a common system for
recording and controlling issued documents while building a system for pro-
tection of personal data. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the
possibility of integration of the proposed system with a system of a higher level,
for example, the EU. We offer two possible options for such integration. In the
first variant, we take into account that the local Blockchain was created by each
country separately and it is necessary to integrate them into a single system.
To do this, it is planned to create a single EU Blockchain, which will contain
blocks of local chains as transactions. In this case, the order of recording specific
blocks of each country will be specified separately (Fig. 6).
Figure 6: Overall structure of the nested Blockchain
The second option involves creation of a more complex structure. The main
chain consists of 29 blocks: B0 - genesis block and 28 (or other number) subse-
quent blocks (according to the number of EU member countries), each of which
is a genesis block for a Subchain, which includes the Blockchain of each member
country. This will allow adding new blocks to the main chain while expanding
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the EU in the future. Fig. 7 shows the structure of such a Blockchain.
Figure 7: Two-level Tree Blockchain for the EU countries
It should be noted, that in the case of the creation of a single system for
all EU countries ”from scratch”, there will be no need to integrate national
systems. It is enough to add a marker of the country that issued the document
(the country of the creation of the block).
3.3. SubBlockchain for access control and evaluation of ID-cards
In addition to creating fake personalities, there is also a threat of unautho-
rized access to personal information as well as its transfer by users to third
parties. To control access, it is proposed to create a SubBlockchain, which will
record information about each access attempt to a specific block and the use of
information from it. The structure of such a circuit is shown on Fig. 8.
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B0 B1 … Bn-1 Bn
B11
B12
⁞
B1(m-1)
B1m
B(n-1)1
B(n-1)2
⁞
B(n-1)(m-1)
B(n-1)m
Bn1
Bn2
⁞
Bn(m-1)
Bnm
B2
B21
B22
⁞
B2(m-1)
B2m
Figure 8: Generalized structure of ID-card processor
In this case, the block of the main chain is a Genesis Block for a Subchain.
Thus, we get the number of Subchains equal to the number of blocks in the main
chain. Information about access time, device from which the user entered and
information about the user (as well as other necessary items for unambiguous
identification of the user) will be recorded in the blocks of this chain.
If the national chain will be integrated into a higher level system as described
above, the scheme for constructing the Subchain has the form shown on Fig. 9.
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B0 B1 … Bn
B11
B12
⁞
B1m
Bn1
⁞
Bnm
B112 B121
⁞
B12k
B111
⁞
B11k
B1m1
⁞
B1mk
B121
⁞
B12k
B121
⁞
B12k
B1end
Bnend
request
response
request
response
responce
request
response
request
response
request
Figure 9: Blockchain Tree. There is a system of three Blockchains which are con-
nected which each other. The green BC is the main and contains a personal
information about ID-card holder; the yellow BC is a Sub BC and contains infor-
mation about reissued ID-cards; the red chain is the 2nd Sub BC and contains
logs of customers, police, and other officers of special services.
Specialized police scanners, smartphones with NFS module and fingerprint
scanner may be used for checking the documents. In this case, the device re-
ceives HASH for the checked document from the closest node of the system and
compares it with the HASH of the submitted document. Identification of the
owner of the document is done by built-in fingerprint sensor.
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Table 3.Algorithm of Block formation in a multichain
Set value: n, m, k, KEY = integer, B0, Bi,-string 
Input: n, m, B0- genesis block (B0), 
Begin 
 For 1i n do 
  Input: a1, a2,…, an (name, Surname, age, sex,… of ID-card holder) 
   Create Bi { a1, a2,…, an } 
   Renew personal information 
   Input: annew 
   an=annew 
   Create: Bi+1{annew} 
 end For 
  Input: key 
  If key=KEY to  
   Create Bnmk 
   Read Bnm 
   Print Bn 
  Else Create Bnmk  
  end If  
end 
3.4. Mathematical model
Mathematical structure of the main complete chain is:
F =
∞⋃
i=0
Bi
Here n - the modes number of main chain.
Analytic expression, describing the structure of the complete chain (Fig.7), will
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have the form of (1).
F = B0
n⋃
i=1
Bi
m⋃
j=1
Bj , [i, j ∈ R] (1)
where the notation is as follows: m - number of elements in a Subchain; n -
number of elements of the main chain.
BC can be described by the following formula, in the case described in 3.3 of
Fig.8:
F = B0
n⋃
i=1
Bi
m∧
j=1
Bj , [i, j ∈ R] (2)
In the case of creating an additional Subchain for the control of personal
data, the formula (3) will take the following form:
F = B0
n⋃
i=1
Bi
m∧
j=1
Bj
p⋃
j,k
Bj,k, [i, j, k ∈ R] (3)
The BC structure described on Fig. 6 can be represented as follows:
F = B0
28⋃
i=1
Bi
m⋃
j=1
Bi,j , [i, j ∈ R] (4)
here B0, Bi – the blocks which constitute the main chain (EU chain); Bj -
the blocks which are constitute the chains of each member-country.
Then, taking into account the second Subchain storing information about access
to personal data:
F = B0
28⋃
i=1
Bi
m⋃
j=1
Bi,j
p⋃
k=1
Bi,j,k, [i, j, k ∈ R] (5)
4. Summary and discussion
In this paper we introduce a novel methodology based on Blockchain for
building storage, access control and document verification mechanisms for mi-
gration control area. The proposed work is based on Subchains, connected to a
main Blockchain and each other. The solution is more security than currently
19
existing due to use the mutual intersection of several Blockchains in the one
system. This makes the process of hacking and falsification of critical infor-
mation more difficult, since in the event of an attack it will be necessary to
change not one but several Blockchains, which considerably increases the cost
of such an attack and makes it unprofitable for the attacker. The noted above
methodology for building a storage system, access control and document verifi-
cation can be used not only for ID-cards but also for other documents, such as
driver’s licenses, education documents, personal medical information and social
security cards, etc. The proposed methodology still requires further improve-
ment in order to contribute to its reliable implementation and legal compliance
(in particular referring to GDPR). For example, we left out some problems of
building real networks, such as devices and communication lines delays. In our
future work we will consider the problem of using various consensus algorithms
with different types of Blockchains. Also, this work did not address the use of
specialized equipment for checking documents in the field with the creation of
a separate closed network and using these devices as nodes of such a network.
These questions will be considered and presented in the next paper.
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